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CONSTITUTIONAL FICTION: AN ANALYSIS OF THE SUPREME
COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES

[W]e must not blink at the fact that legal philosophy is but one
branch of learning with peculiarities of its own....

The legal

profession, like many another, tends to become over-professionalized. We forget that law is the rule for simple and untaught
people to live by. We complicate and over-refine it as a weapon
in legal combat until we take it off the ground where people
live and into the thin atmosphere of sheer fiction.'
The religion clauses of the United States Constitution when written
were intended to prevent the federal government from either persecuting
religious groups or using religion as a mechanism to consolidate federal
power. The Supreme Court for the past forty years apparently chose
to ignore that history and purpose, and only in two recent decisions,
Lynch v. Donally and Marsh v. Chambers,' and in Justice Rehnquist's
dissenting opinion in Wallace v. Jaffree has the history surrounding
the religion clauses been judicially revived.
This Comment presents an examination of the religion clauses. Part
I examines and explores the recently revived historical framework in
which the First Amendment was adopted and demonstrates that the
Establishment Clause test now employed by the Supreme Court is based
on a faulty interpretation of history. Part II examines the First Amendment jurisprudence, emphasizing the distinction between the current
interpretation and the traditional interpretation, and suggests that strict
adherence to the current interpretation leads to anachronistic, impractical,
and nonsensical results. Part III presents a reformulation of the First
Amendment religion clause tests.
1. AN HISTORICA,

ANALYSIS OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES

An examination of the circumstances surrounding the passage of
the religion clauses in the First Amendment demonstrates that the founding fathers had two objectives. The first, and most important, objective
was to prevent the federal government from establishing a particular

I.
2.
3.
4.

Copyright 1986, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
R. Jackson. The Struggle For Judicial Supremacy 292 (1941).
104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984). See also discussion infra notes 111-120.
463 U.S. 783, 103 S. Ct. 3330 (1983). See also discussion infra notes 111-120.
105 S. Ct. 2479, 2508 (1985)(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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religious sect as a national religion. This concern is manifested in the
wording of the Establishment Clause: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion. .

. ."I

The term "establishment,"

as used by the framers of the First Amendment in 1791, refers to the
exclusive patronage given to certain religious sects by the States and
governments of Europe. 6 An "established" religion, such as the Anglican
Church in England, receives subsidies not given to other churches, and
church membership may be a requisite for the holding of political
offices.7 Establishment is the union of a religious faith and the state,
typically to the detriment of other religions. The first of the two religion
clauses was designed to prevent the federal government from establishing
a particular religious sect as a national religion.
The second objective of Congress was to insure the free exercise of
religion. Thus the Free Exercise Clause provides: "Congress shall make
no law respecting ... the free exercise ..." of religion. This clause

was designed to prevent Congress from passing laws which unreasonably
interfered with specific religious practices. It was designed to prevent
the federal government from persecuting any single religious sect or
belief. This clause, not the Establishment Clause, was designed to protect
religious freedom.
Today, according to the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Establishment Clause in Lemon v. Kurtzman,9 a state or federal law violates
the Establishment Clause unless it (1) has a secular purpose; 0 (2)has
a primary or principal effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion;
and (3) does not foster an excessive government entanglement with
religion." This test precludes most government aid or acknowledgment
of religion. By preventing government assistance to religion and the
axioms of religious faith, the Court has fostered a "constitutional common law"' 2 insulated from legislative reform and the historical realities
of the document they interpret.
The founders' intent can be drawn from three sources: the ratification debates and the circumstances surrounding them; the legislative
acts passed by the Congress which ratified the First Amendment; and
5. U.S. Const. amend. I.
6. L. Pfeffer, Church, State & Freedom 68-70 (1953).
7. Id.at 45-47.
8. U.S. Const. amend. 1.
9. 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105 (1971).
10. The plurality opinion in Wallace suggests that this prong has been modified to
require that the sole purpose of the statute be religious. See infra note 124.
11. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613-14, 91 S. Ct. at 2111.

12. The use of the phrase "constitutional common law" to describe the Court's line
of cases interpreting the first ten amendments is not the author's, but is taken from
Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Forward: Constitutional Common Law, 89
Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1975).
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the historical references relied upon by the Supreme Court to justify or
provide the impetus for the current interpretation of the Establishment
Clause. The first two sources have been the basis for two recent Supreme
4
Court decisions, 3 the dissent by Justice Rehnquist in Wallace v. Jaffree,
and commentary and criticism of the Court's current approach to ChurchState relations. 5
A. Ratification Debates and Circumstances Surrounding the Adoption
of the First Amendment
The colonization of the New World brought with it the European
patterns of Church-State union and religious oppression; there was little
recognition of religious freedom. What the immigrants did bring, however, were the seeds from which religious tolerance would eventually
grow. Colonization imported with it a multitude of different sects:
Catholics, Separatists, Puritans, Quakers, Presbyterians, Baptists, Lutherans, Dunkards and others.' 6 Religious diversity gave the colonists
no alternative but to learn to live together. Diversity discouraged uniformity and encouraged toleration. Further, daily exposure to differing
religious beliefs tended to weaken passionate conviction in the exclusive
righteousness of one's own faith. Another element which encouraged
toleration was commerce. Trade has little chance of prospering when
those engaged in it allow religious differences to come between them.' 7
Finally, the Revolutionary War encouraged toleration, by unifying the
colonists under the common ideological course of vindicating their mistreatment by the King of England.'"
State freedom to regulate religion and religious beliefs, prior to and
even after the Constitution and the Bill of Rights were adopted, was
unlimited. 9 When the Constitution was adopted, only two states, Virginia

13. See Lynch v. Donally, 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S.
783, 103 S. Ct. 3330 (1983).
14. See 105 S. Ct. at 2508 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
15. Brief for Appellant at 16-42, Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985) (Nos.
83-812, 83-929). Compare Devins & Feder, Ist Amendment's Religion Clauses: Balancing
Two Contrasting Views, The Nat'l L.J., Nov. 25, 1985, at 24, col. 1.
16. In the American Colonies there were at least 256 different sects and denominations.
Pfeffer, supra note 6, at 83.

17.
18.

Id.
Id.at 86-88.

19. The Bill of Rights when adopted did not apply to the states. The first case so
holding, although technically only applicable to the Fifth Amendment, was Barron v.
Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). In Permioli v. First Municipality, 44 U.S. (3
How.) 589 (1845), the Court specifically held that the Free Exercise clause was inapplicable
to the states. The Court applied the Free Exercise Clause to the states for the first time
in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 60 S. Ct. 900 (1940), and the Establishment

172
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and Rhode Island, tolerated all religions. One state, New York, also

Clause in McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 68 S. Ct. 461 (1948). See also
dicta in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 67 S. Ct. 504 (1947).
In Cantwell, the Court struck down a Massachusetts licensing statute which required a
permit to disseminate religious literature. The Court found that the term "liberty" as
used in the Fourteenth Amendment embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment. The Court did not distinguish between the two religion clauses, but the facts only
required the incorporation of the Free Exercise Clause.
Justice Black in Everson assumed that the Establishment Clause applied to the states.
Since, however, the statute was upheld, the Court did not actually strike down a state
statute for violating the clause until 1948 in McCollum.
One argument regarding incorporation of the religion clauses which has been ignored
focuses on the Blaine Amendment, proposed in 1876. The resolution provided:
No State shall make any law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; and no money raised by taxation in any State for the
support of public schools or derived from any public fund therefor, nor any
public lands devoted thereto, shall ever be under the control of any religious
sect or denomination; nor shall any money so raised or lands so devoted be
divided between religious sects or denominations.
4 Cong. Rec. 5580 (August 14, 1876) (statement of Sen. Kernan). The significance of the
proposed amendment as pointed out by one author is three-fold:
(I) The first clause of this proposal, aside from its applicability to state action,
was in the identical words of the First Amendment.
(2) The measure was proposed and discussed only seven years after the ratification
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
(3) It was considered by the Forty-fourth Congress, which included twenty-three
members of the Thirty-ninth Congress, two of whom had actively participated
in the drafting of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Meyer, The Blaine Amendment And The Bill Of Rights, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 939, 941
(1951). Senator Frelinghuysen's remarks regarding the proposed amendments clearly indicate
that the Fourteenth Amendment did not incorporate the First Amendment:
I call the attention of the Senate to the first alteration the House amendment
makes in our Constitution. The first amendment to the Constitution, enacted
shortly after the adoption of the Constitution, provides that-Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. This is an inhibition on Congress, and not on the States. The
House article very properly extends the prohibition of the first amendment of
the Constitution to the States. . . . Thus the article as amended by the Senate
prohibits the States, for the first time, from the establishment of religion, from
the prohibiting its free exercise, and from making any religious test a qualification
to office.
4 Cong. Rec. 5561 (August 14, 1876) (statement of Sen. Frelinghuysen).
The opposition to the proposed amendment interestingly relied upon Thomas Jefferson.
Senator Stevenson stated:
Friend as he [Jefferson] was of religious freedom, he would never have consented
that the States, which brought the Constitution into existence, upon whose
sovereignty this instrument rests, which keep it within its expressly limited powers,
should be degraded and that the Government of the United States, a Government
of limited authority, the mere agent of the States with prescribed powers, should
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tolerated all religions, but required citizens to abjure foreign allegiance
and subjection in all matters ecclesiastical and civil. Six states-New
Hampshire, Connecticut, New Jersey, Georgia, North and South Carolina-maintained religious establishment, and two states-Maryland and
Delaware-demanded Christianity.20 The trend at the time the Constitution was adopted was towards toleration and free exercise, but establishment and state encouragement of religion was still the general rule.
1.

A Natural Law Philosophy

When the Constitution and the Bill of Rights were adopted, American society operated under a natural law theory. It is taken for granted
today that some people doubt the existence of God; others disavow the
possibility of "eternal truisms." In the late eighteenth century, however,
such an understanding -of the world, although perhaps thought about,
was not widely practiced, preached, or generally acknowledged. The
natural law theory can be best understood as a commitment to two
postulates. First, the moral soundness of law is a condition for its
validity, and therefore an unjust or immoral act by the legislature or
monarch was not considered a law. Second, the moral order is part of
the natural order and is 'read off' from essences or purposes fixed
(perhaps by God) in nature." ' 2' Underlying the revolution and the thoughts
of the Founding Fathers was this natural law philosophy which presumed

undertake to take possession of their schools and their religion.
4 Cong. Rec. 5589 (August 14, 1876) (statement of Sen. Stevenson).
The amendment failed to garner the requisite two-thirds majority required for its
submission to the states. Mr. Meyer concludes his article:
[T]he debates on the Blaine Amendment and the later attempts to make the
religious provisions of the First Amendment binding upon the states point up
the historical inaccuracy of concluding that the Fourteenth Amendment was
intended to incorporate these provisions. To the extent that Mr. Justice Black
relies upon historical evidence rather than a judgment based on current needs,
his view, favoring incorporation of the entire Bill of Rights, is accordingly
weakened.
Meyer, supra, at 945. See also, F. O'Brien, Justice Reed And The First Amendment 11617 (1957); J. McClellan, Joseph Story and the American Constitution 152-55 (1971);
Jaffree v. Board of School Comm'r, 554 F. Supp. 1104, 1125-26 (S.D. Ala. 1983).
20. C. Antieau, A. Downey & E. Roberts, Freedom From Federal Establishment:
Formation And Early History Of The First Amendment Religion Clauses 62-110 (1964).
21. J. Murphy & J. Coleman, The Philosophy of Law: An Introduction to Jurisprudence 17 (1984). The classical natural law theory tied law to morality. The significance
was that it "brought to light the need for moral criticism of law and got people thinking
about obligation rather than force as the essence of law." Id. at 19. Critics of the classical
theory have attempted to separate law from morality, and in some areas such as tort law
they have succeeded. See, e.g., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, iI N.E.
1050 (1916). while in other areas such as criminal law they have not, see J. Hall, Criminal
Law 93 (2d ed. 1960).
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the existence, either in the form of reason or godly intervention, of a
higher being. Professor Edgar Bodenheimer writes:
It can safely be stated that there is no country in the world
where the idea of a law of nature, understood as a safeguard
of liberty and property against government encroachments, gained
higher significance for the political and social developments and
the molding of all political and legal institutions than in the
22
United States of America.
The natural law principle assumes that there exist some eternal
axioms. Whether they be the beliefs advocated by the Catholic, Jewish,
or Lutheran Church is not relevant; instead, what is important is that
the persons who drafted the Constitution viewed religion as one of the
conduits for determining right conduct. What is at odds with this belief
is the adoption of legislation which would prevent the free exercise of
these beliefs. Aid or encouragement to religion as a whole is not prohibited under such.a mind set, because legislators sought to incorporate
these truths into law, and religion was considered one of the mechanisms
by which these truths could be discovered. A law written to encourage
all religions was also a mechanism which encouraged general public
morality.23 At the time of the drafting of the First Amendment, government separate and apart from religion did not prevent legislation
24
promoting religion generally.
2. Ratification Debates
Of the eleven colonies which ratified the Constitution, three recommended that the Constitution be amended to include a declaration
of religious freedom. New Hampshire's amendment provided: "Congress
shall make no laws touching religion, or to infringe the rights of conscience. ' ' 2 New York's recommendation was: "That the people have an
equal, natural, and unalienable right freely and peaceably to exercise
their religion, according to the dictates of conscience; and that no
religious sect or society ought to be favored or established by law in
preference to others. 2 6 Finally, Virginia recommended that a clause be
adopted which provided:
That religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and
the manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason

22. E. Bodenheimer, Jurisprudence: The Philosophy and Method of the Law 52 (rev'd
ed. 1974).
23. H. Storing, What the Anti-Federalists Were For 21-23 (1981).
24. See, e.g., Terret v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 42 (1815).
25. I The Debates of the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal
Constitution 326 (J. Elliot 2d ed. 1937) [hereinafter cited as The Debales].
26.

Id. at 328.
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and conviction, not by force or violence; and therefore all men
have an equal, natural, and unalienable right to the free exercise
of religion, according to the dictates of conscience, and that no
particular religious sect or society ought to be established or
27
favored, by law, in preference to others.
Two states, Rhode Island and North Carolina, ratified the Constitution
on the condition that a Bill of Rights would be adopted in the near
future, and both proposed a guarantee of religious freedom which was
2
identical to that proposed by Virginia. 1
A careful reading of these proposed amendments indicates that only
the recommendation made by New Hampshire, if given a reasonable
construction, could be interpreted to require an absolute separation of
church and state. The other states' amendments, however, required only
that the federal government not interfere with the free exercise of religion, establish a particular religious sect as a federal church, or oth29
erwise interfere with the states' policies towards religion.
James Madison is often cited by those who advocate a broad reading
of the Establishment Clause. Nevertheless, his statements in the ratification debates demonstrate that he read the clause only to prohibit the
formation of a national religion. Congress debated the wording of what
was to become the First Amendment on August 15, 1789. The proposed
amendment which was the subject of the debate read: "[N]o religion
shall be established by law, nor shall the equal rights of conscience be
infringed." 30 Madison indicated that he was not sure that the clause
was necessary, but supported the amendment because:
[S]ome of the State Conventions, who seemed to entertain an
opinion that under the clause of the constitution, which gave
power to Congress to make all laws necessary and proper to
carry into execution the constitution, and the laws under it,
enabled them to make laws of such a nature as might infringe
the rights of conscience, and establish a national religion.'
To the extent Madison did support the amendment, his support was
for an amendment which would prohibit the federal government from

27. Id. at 659.
28. Id. at 334-35; 4 The Debates 244.
29. The Supreme Court interpreted such a proposed amendment in Terrell, 13 U.S.
(9 Cranch) at 48 (Virginia had adopted their proposed provision in their bill of rights in
1776).
30. I Annals of Cong. 137. The language Madison originally proposed which was
sent to committee was: "The civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious
belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be established, nor shall the full and
equal rights of conscience be in any manner, or any pretext, infringed." Id. at 434. The
committee revised Madison's proposal to read as debated on August 15, 1789.
31. Id.at 730.
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favoring a particular religious sect. Madison responded to opponents of
the amendment who believed that the amendment could be interpreted
to hurt religion generally, by asserting that: "[I1f the word national was
inserted before religion, it would satisfy the minds of honorable gentlemen. He [Madison) believed that the people feared one sect might obtain
a pre-eminence, or two combined together, and establish a religion to
which they would compel others to conform.13 2 Although the debates
do not express Madison's personal religious views, they do demonstrate
that Madison perceived the Establishment Clause as a mechanism written
only to prevent laws which benefit a particular religious sect.
The comments made by Congressional delegates, other than Madison,
also support a narrow reading of the Establishment Clause. Representative Peter Sylvester of New York disliked the proposed amendment,
not because it failed to protect religious freedom, but because it might
be susceptible to an erroneous interpretation. Representative Sylvester
"apprehended that it was liable to a construction different from what
had been made by the committee. He feared it might be thought to
have a tendency to abolish religion altogether." 3 Representative Huntington, like Madison, believed that the amendment was designed to
prevent the federal government from giving preferential treatment to a
particular religious sect, but, like Representative Sylvester, he believed
that:
[O]thers might find it convenient to put another construction
upon it. . . . He hoped, therefore, that the amendment would
be made in such a way as to secure the rights of conscience,
and a free exercise of the rights of religion, but not to patronize
4
those who professed no religion at all.1
The House, a week after the debates, voted on and adopted a
religion clause which read, "Congress shall make no law establishing
religion, or to prevent the free exercise thereof, or to infringe the rights
of conscience."" The Senate considered the proposal and sent a modified
version back to the House: "Congress shall make no law establishing
articles of faith or a mode of worship, or prohibiting the free exercise
of religion." 3 6 The House rejected the Senate's changes, and a conference
was then called which produced the version which was ultimately adopted.
The record of the ratification proceedings demonstrates that "an
establishment of religion" was intended only to prohibit Congress from

32. Id.
33. Id. at 729.
34. Id. at 730-31.
35. Id.at 766.
36. C. Antieau, supra note 20, at 130-31.
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aiding a particular religion. To suggest a broader interpretation is contrary to the historical record and the intent of its authors.
B. Acts of Congress and the Federal Government Interpreting the
First Amendment
Legislation of the Congress and acts of government officials who
advocated, voted for, and eventually adopted the First Amendment
demonstrate that the Establishment Clause was not intended to prevent
legislation which benefits religion. Many may not consider actions such
as a solitary law, speech, or prayer to be irrefutable evidence of the
general legislative intent. Nevertheless, legislative acts considered in conjunction with the attitudes and opinions expressed in the ratification
debates raise an inference as to the founders' intent which has not been
rebutted by the present majority of the Court."1
The first Congress passed laws which authorized the appointment
of paid chaplains, provided for the funding of missionaries, and set
aside federal land for religion in each township of the federal territories.
Moreover, the President not only encouraged religion, but set aside a
holiday to thank God.
1. Paid Chaplains

The Continental Congress beginning in 1774 opened its sessions with
a prayer offered by a paid chaplain.3" This practice was then later
adopted by the First Congress. Both the House and Senate appointed
a committee to consider the manner of electing chaplains. 9 Three days
after Congress passed a statute to provide for the payment of these
chaplains, the same Congress reached an agreement on the language of
the Bill of Rights.40
These practices suggest that the Establishment Clause was not intended to prohibit such action. It is difficult to imagine that the Congress
which adopted a statute to pay a chaplain's salary three days later would

37. In Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 788, 103 S. Ct. 3330, 3334 (1983), the
Court recognized the significance of history as an aid in interpreting the religion clauses.
Nevertheless, the Court's recognition of history has been piece-meal. Justice Brennan, for
instance, would abandon history altogether, see Marsh, 463 U.S. at 816, 103 S. Ct. at
3348 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 23738, 83 S.Ct. 1560, 1579 (1963) (Brennan, J.,concurring).
38. I J.of the Cont. Cong. 26 (1774); 2 J. of the Cont. Cong. 12 (1775); 5 J.of
the Cont. Cong. 530 (1776); 6 J.of the Cont. Cong. 887 (1776); 27 J.of the Cont.
Cong. 683 (1784).
39. 1 J.of Senate 16 (April 7, 1789); 1 J. of the House Report 26 (April 9, 1789).
40. The statute provided that: "[Tlhere shall be allowed to each chaplain of Congress
...five hundred dollars per annum during the session of Congress." Act of September
22, 1789, I Stat. 70-71.
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approve an amendment to the Constitution which would nullify that
legislatiorg.
2. The Northwest Ordinance
The same Congress which adopted the Establishment Clause also
reenacted and gave full effect to the Northwest Ordinance, which recognized that the government should foster religion in order to encourage
good government and general public morality.4 I The Ordinance, like the
chaplain statute, reflects an intention behind the adoption of the Establishment Clause which is at odds with the test propounded by the
present Supreme Court.
The original Northwest Ordinance predates the Constitution. The
Continental Congress, in a series of Acts relating to the territories, set
aside land for the support of religion and provided land grants for
education which were not limited to public schools. "Religion, morality,
and knowledge, being necessary to good government and the happiness
of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged. '4' 2 Moreover, the land patent to John Symms, granted pursuant to the Northwest Ordinance, specified that Section 29 of each
43
township would be used for the "purpose of religion."
After the adoption of the Constitution, the First Congress reenacted
the Northwest Ordinance in 1789 to insure its validity. Such actions are
not those of men who envision a "wall of separation," but instead the
actions of men who wrote an amendment 'which left them the power
to foster religion.
3. Miscellaneous Actions
Thomas Jefferson, cited by those who favor a wall separating Church
and State, did not always act* in a manner which supports such a
conclusion. For instance, Mr. Jefferson signed a.treaty with the Kaskaskia Indians which provided annual cash support to the tribe's Roman
Catholic priest and church. The treaty provided as follows:
And whereas, The greater part of the said tribe have been
baptised and received into the Catholic church to which they
are much attached, the United States will give annually for seven
years one hundred dollars towards the support of a priest of

41. Brief for Appellant at 16-31, Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985) (Nos.
83-812, 83-929).
42. Ordinance of July 13, 1789, I Laws of the United States 475, 479 (1815); Laws
of the United States-Relating to the Public Lands 356, 360 no.32 (1828).
43. 2 Statutes of Ohio and of the Northwest Territory, ch. 638, 1450-52 (1824)
(Salmon P. Chase, ed. 1834).
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three hundred dollars to assist the

said tribe in the erection of a church."
Moreover, from 1789 to 1823, the Congress provided a trust endowment
of up to 12,000 acres of land "for the Society of the United Bretheren,
for propagatingthe Gospel among the Heathen.41 5 This Act was renewed
and signed into law by Presidents Washington, Adams and Jefferson.
Such grants, however, were not limited to Indians. In 1787, Congress
provided land to the Ohio Company, including acreage for the support
of religion, and reauthorized this grant in 1792.46 In 1833, Congress
authorized the State of Ohio to sell land which had been set aside by
the federal government when Ohio was a territory. Congress conditioned
the sale upon using the proceeds "for the support of religion ...

and

for no other use or purpose whatsoever. 4 7 Finally, not until 1897, when
aid to sectarian education for Indians had reached $500,000 annually,
48
did Congress cease appropriating money for such schools.
These acts reflect a Congress and a nation not at odds with religion,
but that wanted to encourage religion as long as it did not result in
the establishment of one religious sect. History does not support the
Lemon tripartite test. Such a test encourages judicial activism and effectively makes the Court the ultimate legislator on religious issues; few
can doubt that the actions of the First Congress just surveyed would
49
not survive the Lemon test.
C. ConstitutionalCommon Law and The First Amendment: An
Analysis of The Supreme Court's Interpretation of History
The present Court's historical interpretation can be traced to Justice
Black's opinion in Everson v. Board of Education.50 In Everson, the
Supreme Court held that a state law which pays bus fare for parochial
and public school pupils does not violate the Establishment Clause.
Although the conclusion reached by Justice Black and the majority

44. Treaty with Kaskaskias, Act of Aug. 13, 1803, 7 Stat. 79.
45. Act of June 1, 1796, 1 Stat. 490 (emphasis in the original). See section 5 of the
Act which requires three tracts to be surveyed for the purpose of propagating the Gospel
among the heathen. Id. at 491.
46. Act of April 21, 1792, I Stat. 257.
47. Act of Feb. 20, 1833, ch. XLIL, 4 Stat. 618-19.
48. Act of June 7,1897, ch. 3, 30 Stat. 62,'79.
49. Until the decision in Wallace, the Court had indicated that they may abandon
the Lemon test. In Marsh, Chief Justice Burger made no reference to the test in upholding
a Nebraska statute. Though several justices express their doubts about Lemon, a majority
is unwilling to abandon it. See Wallace, 105 S. Ct. at 2496-97 (O'Connor, J., concurring)
("the Lemon test has proven problematic ... because I am new to the struggle, I am
not ready to abandon all aspects of the Lemon test.").
50. 330 U.S. I, 67 S. Ct. 504 (1947).
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retains the semblance of a narrow reading of the Establishment Clause,
Justice Black's analysis was erroneous. That analysis was used in later
Court decisions to justify an improper reading of the Establishment
Clause. Justice Black made three errors which became the basis for the
Court's present reading of the Establishment Clause: (1) he assumed
that the First Amendment incorporates not only the State of Virginia's
Bill of Rights, but Virginia's statutory laws on the subject of religion;
(2) he erroneously interpreted Virginia's laws to require an absolute
separation of church and state; (3) he imputed to Madison a definition
of "Establishment" which does not comport with history or Madison's
actions, and used Jefferson's metaphor of a "Wall of Separation" out
of context. Justice Black, after concluding that the Founders intended
to build a wall of separation, reasoned that: "Neither a state nor the
Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which
aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another."'"
Everson established the principle that government may not aid religion. The purpose of this section is to demonstrate that the reasoning
used to reach that conclusion is not grounded in historical reality, but
emanates from the personal philosophies of Supreme Court Justices who
perceive as improper legislative acts which aid and encourage general
public morality through their encouragement of religion.
1. Virginia As An Early Version of the First Amendment?
Justice Black concluded that the Establishment Clause is coterminous
with Virginia's Bill of Rights, passed in 1776, and subsequent acts by
the Virginia legislature: "This Court . . . recognize[s] that the provisions
of the First Amendment, in the drafting and adoption of which Madison
and Jefferson played such leading roles, had the same objective and
were intended to provide the same protection against governmental intrusion on religious liberty as the Virginia statute."5' 2 This section of
the comment will attempt to demonstrate that Justice Black's reliance
upon Virginia's laws and Madison and Jefferson's personal opinions
was misguided.
It cannot be denied that Virginia, when compared to the other
twelve States, took a unique approach towards Church-State relations.
Prior to the Revolutionary War Virginia had established the Anglican
Church. Virginia law provided for religious services according to the
laws and orders of the Church of England, compulsory attendance at
religious services, lands for the clergy and taxation for payment of
ministers' salaries and the upkeep of the church."

51.
52.
53.

330 U.S. at 15, 67 S. Ct. at 511 (emphasis added).
Id. at 13, 67 S. Ct. at 510.
Pfeffer, supra note 6, at 93-95.
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On June 12, 1776, Virginia adopted a Bill of Rights. Section 16
concerned religion and provided:
That religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and
the manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason
and conviction, not by force or violence; and therefore all men
are equally entitled to the free exercise of religion according to
the dictates of conscience; and that it is the mutual duty of all
to practice Christian forbearance, love, and charity towards each
4
other.
The Virginia Bill of Rights adopted the principle of "Free Exercise."
However, it neither disestablished the Anglican Church in Virginia nor
prohibited laws encouraging religion.
The Anglican Church was officially disestablished in Virginia by the
state legislature ten years later. It is from this statute, not the Virginia
Bill of Rights, which Justice Black quoted to support his contention
that the religion clauses prohibit laws aiding or assisting religion. That
statute provided:
That no man shall be compelled to frequent or support any
religious worship, place, or Ministry whatsoever, nor shall be
enforced, restrained, molested, or burthened, in his body or
goods, nor shall otherwise suffer on account of his religious
opinions or belief; but that all men shall be free to profess,
and by argument to maintain, their opinions in matters of
religion, and that the same shall in no wise diminish, enlarge,
or affect their civil capacities. 5
What Justice Black left OUt, 5 6 however, was Section 3 of the statute,
which stated that this principle was subject to subsequent modification
by the legislature. Section 3 provided:
And though we well know that this Assembly elected by the
people for the ordinary purposes of legislation only, have no
power to restrain the acts of succeeding Assemblies, constituted
with powers equal to our own, and that therefore to declare
this act to be irrevocable, would be of no effect in law; yet we
are free to declare, and do declare, that the rights hereby as-

54. Act of June 12, 1776, ch. 3, I Laws of Virginia 32 (1819). The Supreme Court
reviewed the entire series of Virginia law relating to religion in Terret, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch)
at 46-47.
55. Act of December 16, 1785, ch. 2, I Laws of Virginia 77, 788 (1819). Justice
Black cited to this section of the statute in Everson, 330 U.S. at 13, 67 S. Ct. at 510.
56. Leo Pfeffer in his book Church, State & Freedom also fails to explain the
significance of section 3 of the statute, see Pfeffer, supra note 6, at 102 (he does make
reference to section 3 of the statute, but fails to recognize its significance).
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serted, are of the natural rights of mankind, and that if any
act shall be hereafter passed to repeal the present, or to narrow
its operation, such act will be an infringement of natural right."
For Justice Black to cite this Virginia statute as support for his interpretation of the religion clauses, which cannot be modified by either
state or federal legislatures, was erroneous. This statute, unlike the
religion clauses, did not bind future legislatures from either re-establishing the state church or encouraging religion. A more proper comparison is drawn between Virginia's Bill of Rights and the religion
clauses; however, as already discussed, the Virginia Bill of Rights did
not disestablish the state religion; it merely required laws which allow
for free exercise of religion.
Although Justice Black read the statute as a bar to legislation
promoting religion, the Virginia legislature was under no such misconception. The same Virginia legislature which created this supposed wall
of separation passed statutes which gave special protection to religion.
For example, one such statute provided that:
3. No officer for any civil cause shall arrest any minister . . .
while such minister shall be publicly preaching or performing
religious worship ... on the pain of imprisonment or amercement ....
4. [[If any person shall, on purpose, maliciously or contemptuously, disquiet or disturb any congregation assembled in any
church . . . or misuse any such minister . . . than any justice
before whom proof of the offence shall be made, may cause the
offender to find two securities for his good behavior, and, in
default thereof, shall commit him to prison."8
Moreover, a statute adopted first in 1705, and reenacted in 1733, 1752,
1769 and 1819, made it a penalty to labor on Sunday:
If any person on a sabbath day shall himself be found laboring
at his own, or any other trade, or calling, or other business,
except it be in the ordinary household offices of daily necessity,
or other work of necessary charity, he shall forfeit the sum of
one dollar and sixty-seven cents for every such offence; deeming
every apprentice, servant, or slave, so employed, and every day
he be so employed, as constituting a distinct offense.5 9
Other Virginia statutes also demonstrate that encouragement of religion was not prohibited. The statute requiring a public oath of fidelity

57.
58.
59.

Act of June 12, 1776, ch. 3, 1 Laws of Virginia 32, 33 (1819).
Act of December 26, 1792, ch. 141, I Laws of Virginia 554, 555 (1819).
Id.
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is one example. This statute required public officials, such as the governor or privy councillor, to swear allegiance to the Commonwealth of
Virginia and each oath ended with the phrase "So help me God."
Section 5 of that act made a special provision concerning persons refusing
to take any oath due to religious scruples. Those persons were allowed
to modify the oath so that it was in "accord[ance] with the religion in
which such person professeth to believe."w6 The statute did not require
that the individual have a certain religious belief, but did require the
individual to have some religious belief. Another statute, enacted in
1748 and reenacted in 1752, 1769, 1792, 1794, 1803 and 1814, provided
for the "forfeiture of license by suffering tippling on Lord's day," or
"on any other day set apart by public authority for religious worship." '6
These statutes suggest that the ideal propounded by the Virginia
legislature in 1785 was not designed to curtail the right of the state to
aid or encourage religion in general, but merely to disestablish the
Anglican Church in Virginia.

62

2. Madison, Jefferson, and the Bill of Rights
Both James Madison and Thomas Jefferson played an important
role in the formation of our country, and both were later elected
President. Madison, however, was a Federalist and one of the authors

60. Act of January 7, 1818, ch. 28, 1 Laws of Virginia 73 (1819).
61. Act of February 22, 1819, ch. 240, 2 Laws of Virginia 283 (1819).
62. Even after the passage of this statute remnants of the established church were
maintained, as the Anglican Church continued to enjoy a favored legal status. For example,
glebe lands given to the Anglican Church were not taken away until the legislature
authorized the sale of the land for the benefit of the poor, by act of January 12, 1802,
ch. 32b, I Laws of Virginia 78-81 (1819). The Supreme Court held that the act was
unconstitutional as to land received by the church prior to the creation of the state of
Virginia. Justice Story, writing for a unanimous Court in Terret v. Taylor, stated:
It is conceded on all sides that, at the revolution, the Episcopal church no
longer retained its character as an exclusive religious establishment. And there
can be no doubt that it was competent to the people and to the legislature to
deprive it of its superiority over other religious sects, and to withhold from it
any support by public taxation. But, although it may be true that "religion can
be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or violence," and that
"all men are equally entitled to the free exercise of religion according to the
dictates of conscience," as the bill of rights of Virginia declares, yet it is difficult
to perceive how it. follows as a consequence that the legislature may not enact
laws more effectually to enable all sects to accomplish the great objects of
religion . . . the free exercise of religion cannot be justly deemed to be restrained
by aiding with equal attention the votaries of every sect to perform their own
religious duties, or by establishing funds for the support of ministers, for public
charities, for the endowment of churches, or for the sepulture of the dead.
13 U.S. (9 Cranch) at 48-49. For an excellent discussion of this case see J. McClellan,
Joseph Story and the American Constitution, 129-30 (1971).
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of The Federalist Papers,6 3 while Jefferson was an Anti-Federalist.

4

Justice Black, writing in Everson, ignored that these two men were
politically at odds and imputed to both of them a leading role in the

writing of the First Amendment. A review of the debates and committee
appointments, however, suggests that Jefferson had very little input as
to the wording of the amendment. As to Madison, there is no doubt
that he played an important role; nevertheless, the debates and committee
votes demonstrate that Madison read the Establishment Clause narrowly.

Madison did not perceive the First Amendment as the primary safeguard
of religious liberty, but instead relied upon the structure of the Con-

stitution to safeguard liberties.
Madison's views are evidenced not only from his writings in The
Federalist Papers, but from the recommendations made by the com-

mittees on which he served, and the statements attributed to him during
the ratification debates. One three-man committee of which Madison
was a member recommended giving land to the society for propagating
the gospel among the heathens, and amending two previous acts to

include the designation of land for the support of religion. 65 Furthermore,

a five-man committee on which Madison served recommended that a
particular land contract include the reservation of a lot "perpetually for
the purposes of religion." 66

What Madison opposed was aid either on the state or federal level
which would "support the Religion of the majority of the inhabitants.

'67

63. The Federalist Papers (B. Wright ed. 1961). The three authors of The Federalist
Papers were Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay. The driving force behind
the papers was Alexander Hamilton, who recruited John Jay first. Hamilton then recruited
James Madison, after being turned down by the Gouverneur Morris and deciding that
William Duer did not produce the kind of work he wanted. The three authors wrote
under the pseudonym "Publius." Wills, Introduction to The Federalist Papers ix-xi (1982).
64. See generally H. Storing, I The Complete Anti-Federalist (1981). Representative
Gerry chose a different term for the Anti-Federalists:
Those who were called anti-federalists at that time complained that they had
injustice done them by the title, because they were in favor of a Federal
government, and the others were in favor of a national one; the federalists
were for ratifying the constitution as it stood, and the others not until amendments were made. Their names then ought not to have been distinguished by
federalist and anti-federalist, but rats and anti-rats.
Statements by Representative Gerry, August 15, 1789, 1 Debates of Congress 138 (Benton's
abr. ed. 1857).
65. Report of Committee, September 3, 1788, 34 J. of Cont. Cong. 485.
66. Report of Committee, July 10, 1787, 32 J. of Cont. Cong. 311-12.
67. James Madison in a letter wrote: ."It gives me much pleasure to observe by 2
printed reports sent me by Col. Grayson, that, in the latter, Congress had expunged a
clause contained in the first, for setting apart a district of land in each Township for
supporting the Religion of the majority of inhabitants." I Writings of James Madison
153-54 (1865).
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Madison, writing in The Federalist No. 10, did not view a Bill of Rights
as the protector of liberty but relied upon the federal-state structure:

The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within
their particular States, but will be unable to spread a general
conflagration through the other States. A religious sect may
degenerate into a political faction in a part of the Confederacy;
but the variety of sects dispersed over the entire face of it must
secure the national Councils against any danger from that source."

Madison did not view the Establishment Clause as the mechanism which
would stop the federal government from adopting laws affecting religion,
but believed that the competing interests of the various religious sects

would prevent it. He reasoned that any legislation adopted to aid or
encourage religion would not only have to garner the support of a

substantial majority of the various religious factions, but the support
therefore, legislation would have a tendency
of the public at large, and,
69
to be religiously neutral.
Jefferson, unlike Madison, was an Anti-Federalist, and though the

Anti-Federalists lost the debate over the Constitution, they left a legacy,
the Bill of Rights. An analysis of the Bill of Rights, however, should

not be viewed merely as an exposition of Thomas Jefferson's private
opinions, and this is especially true for the Establishment Clause. Herbert

Storing, author of the multi-volume work The Complete Anti-Federalist,
writes:
[M]any Anti-Federalists were Concerned with the maintenance of
religious conviction as a support of republican government....

68. The Federalist No. 10 at 136 (J. Madison) (B. Wright ed. 1961). For an excellent
discussion of the form of government established by the Constitution see Diamond, The
Federalist on Federalism: "Neither a National Nor a Federal Constitution, But a Composition of Both," 86 Yale L.J. 1273 (1977). Professor Diamond writes:
The modem theory of federalism tends to blind us to such peripheral possibilities
of federalism in the Presidential election process and throughout our political
system. The Federalist's theory is superior in clarity and comprehensiveness.
The reason this can be so, despite nearly two centuries of eventful history since
The Federalist was written, is that its political understanding was not limited
to the historical period within which it was produced. Rather, it speaks to
perennial political issues .

...

Id. at 1285.
69. Shklar, Publius and the Science of the Past, 86 Yale L.J. 1286 (1977). Professor
Shklar writes:
In an extensive republic, factions and parties were sources of cohesion, just as
surely as they were divisive in a small republic. There was proof, moreover.
The multiplicity of religious sects in America illustrated how peace emerged
from the prevalence of small, mutually uncongenial groups. When all were free,
there was peace in numbers, even among Protestant sects. It was a thought
that had occurred to Montesquieu and that could now be taken as proven.
Id.at 1291-92.
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The Anti-Federalists feared that the Americans would follow the
example of the Europeans. . . . '[b]ent on gratification, at the
expense of every moral tie. . . .' They favored religious toleration
....but this was assumed to mean, in practice, toleration of
Christian (or only Protestant) sects and was rarely extended even
in principle to the protection of professed atheists. They saw
no inconsistency between liberty of conscience and the public
support of the religious, and generally Protestant, community
70
as the basis of public and private morality.
There can be no doubt that Jefferson played an advocate's role. Nevertheless, the Bill of Rights is not a declaration of his private views.
Jefferson coined the phrase "a wall of separation between church
and state,"'" which Justice Black used in Everson. Justice Black wrote:
"The First Amendment has erected a wall between church and state.
That wall must be kept high and impregnable. We could not approve
the slightest breach."7 2 What Justice Black did not explain, however, is
that Jefferson used the phrase in a letter he wrote to the Danbury,
Connecticut Baptist Association, to protest the establishment of the
Congregationalist Church in Connecticut. 37 Implicit in such a letter is
the acknowledgement that the State has absolute control of religion.
Dumas Malone writes that if Jefferson "was ever drawn into an attack
on any Church it was not because it was a religious organization but
'74
because it had assumed a political character.
Jefferson like most Americans in the eighteenth century believed in
a God, and his religious views tended towards deism. 75 He was not
opposed to religion, nor was he opposed to states having the right to
support and encourage the ideas and concepts propounded by religion.
In his annual report as Rector to the President and Directors of the
Literary Fund for the University of Virginia, Jefferson set forth his
views on the role of religion in education. Contained in this report was
a proposal, eventually adopted by the University, which provided:
Should the religious sects of this State, or any of them, according
to the invitation held out to them, establish within, or adjacent,
to the precincts of the University, schools for instruction in the
religion of their sect, the students of the University will be free,
and expected to attend religious worship at the establishment of

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

H. Storing, supra note 23, at 22-23.
16 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 281-83 (A. Bergh ed. 1907).
330 U.S. at 18, 67 S. Ct. at 513.
L. Manning, The Law of Church State Relations 19 (1980).
D. Malone, Jefferson and The Rights of Man I1 (1951).
Id.
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their respective sects, in the morning, and in time to meet their
76
school in the University at its stated hours.
Jefferson objected to Virginia's support of a religion to the exclusion
of all other religions.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL FICTION: ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE

The Court's recent decisions pertaining to the religion clauses purport
to follow the early decisions regarding the same subject matter. This
section will examine the Court's original understanding of the Establishment Clause and distinguish those opinions from recent decisions.
A. The Traditional Approach: Supreme Court Decisions From 1791
to 1940
For over one hundred years after the adoption of the First Amendment, no petitioner argued before the Court that a law violated the
Establishment Clause. During this period, however, the Court in cases
dealing with the issue of religion indicated that the clause was designed
to prevent a national religion. The primary issue of concern during this
period was not whether the federal government had the power to encourage religion, but in distinguishing laws which merely encouraged
from those which unduly interfered with the free exercise of religious
worship. Justice Story in his treatise Commentaries on the Constitution
wrote:
The real object of the [First] amendment was, not to countenance, much less to advance Mohametanism, or Judaism, or
infidelity, by prostrating Christanity; but to exclude all rivalry
among Christian sects, and to prevent any national ecclesiastical
establishment, which should give to a hierarchy the exclusive
patronage of the national government. 77
79
Two cases, Terret v. Taylore8 and Vidal v. Girard's Executors,
both decided in the early 1800's, indicate a narrow reading of the
amendment.80 In Terret, the Court held that the Virginia Acts of 1798,

76. L. Manning, supra note 79, at 40-41. See 19 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson
408-417 (A. Bergh ed. 1905).
77. J. -Story, 3 Commentaries on the Constitution at 1871, at 728 (1933).
78. 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 42 (1815).
79. 43 U.S. (2 How.) 127 (1844).
80. The Supreme Court still endorses both Terre and Vidal. Justice Black cited Terret
in Everson for the proposition that the Court since the founding of this country has
given a "broad meaning" to the religion clauses. Everson, 330 U.S. at 15 n.21, 67 S.
Ct. at 511 n.21. See also McCollum, 333 U.S. at 215, 68 S. Ct. at 467 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (citing Vidal for proposition of church-state separation in the area of edu-
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ch. 9 and 1801, ch. 5, so far as they divested the Episcopal Church of

property acquired prior to the revolution by purchase or donation, were
unconstitutional."' The Court had no difficulty distinguishing encour-

agement from establishment and found that Virginia's laws and constitution did not prevent the encouragement of religion.
In Vidal, the complainant-appellant claimed that the law of Pennsylvania prohibited the establishrent of a school whose policies towards

religion were in doubt. The case involved the will of Stephen Girard
who left two million dollars in trust to the City of Philadelphia for the
establishment of a school for "poor, male, white orphan children." The
testament stipulated that "no ecclesiastic, missionary, or minister of any
sect whatsoever, shall hold or exercise any station or duty." ' s2 The

donation was attacked on the grounds that the exclusion of members
of the clergy from the school was incompatible with the common law
and public policy of Pennsylvania. Justice Story, writing for a unanimous
Court, held: (1) That the State of Pennsylvania, not withstanding its
broad constitutional provision for free exercise of religion 3 had adopted
Christianity as part of their common law;8 4 and (2) that this provision
in the will did not violate that common law because the will did not
preclude laymen instructors from teaching principles of Christanity. The

Court found that the testator's intent in excluding the various religions

cation). A close reading of Terret does not support such a contention. Justice Story in
Terret wrote:
But the free exercise of religion cannot be justly deemed to be restrained by
aiding with equal attention the votaries of every sect to perform their own
religious duties. . . . While, therefore, the legislature might exempt the citizens
from a compulsive attendance and payment of taxes insupport of any particular
sect, itisnot perceived that either public or constitutional principles required
the abolition of allreligious corporations.
13 U.S. (9Cranch) at 48-49. In Vidal, the Court held that a willpreventing a religious
sect or sects from teaching in a privately funded orphanage did not violate Pennsylvania's
common law. 43 U.S. (2 How.) at 198-99. See also discussion supra notes 77-79 and
accompanying text.
81. 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) at 51-52.
82. Vidal, 43 U.S. (2 How.) at 133.
83. The Pennsylvania Constitution provides:
That allmen have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God
according to the dictates of their own consciences; no man can of right be
compelled to attend, erect, or support any place or worship, or to maintain
any ministry against hisconsent; no human authority can, inany case whatever,
control or interfere with the rights of conscience; and no preference shall ever
be given by law to any religious establishments or modes of worship.
Pa. Const. art 1,§3.
84. The Court cited a Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision, Updegraph v. The
Commonwealth, 11 Serg. & Rawle 394 (1824), to support the contention that the state
constitution was not intended to exclude Christianity as part of the common law. 43 U.S.
(2 How.) at 198.
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was to preclude the orphans from being unduly influenced by any
particular sect or being taught by a multitude of sects with diverse and
conflicting doctrines."
In 1899 the Court faced for the first time an Establishment Clause
argument in Bradfield v. Roberts.8 6 At issue in Bradfield were appropriations by Congress to the Roman Catholic Church for the maintenance
of a hospital in the District of Columbia. The appellant argued that
the giving of money to one religious institution, the Catholic Church,
constituted an establishment in violation of the First Amendment. The
Court disagreed, noting that the nature of the organization was not
relevant, since the money was given for secular purposes-the administration of a hospital. 7 The Court distinguished the aid designed to
promote the Catholic Church.
In Aver v. United States,"s the Court upheld a federal statute which,
while "relieving from military service in the strict sense the members
of religious sects as enumerated whose tenets excluded the moral right
to engage in war, nevertheless subjected such persons to the performance
89
of service of a noncombatant character to be defined by the President.1
The Court in a cursory opinion replied to the argument that the statute
violated both the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses by saying
"we think its unsoundness is too apparent to require us to do more."' 9°
Finally, in Cochran v. Louisiana State Board of Education,91 the
Court upheld a Louisiana statute which authorized the distribution of
school books to children attending private schools. The statute was
attacked as a "taking of private property for private purposes." 92 The
Court held: "The legislation does not segregate private schools, or their
pupils, as its beneficiaries or attempt to interfere with any matters of
exclusively private concern. Its interest is education, broadly; its method,
comprehensive. Individual interests are aided only as the common interest
is safeguarded. " 93 The Court in this case did not apply the First Amendment, but only the Fourteenth.
The Supreme Court during this period read the Establishment Clause
narrowly. This author suggests that the decisions reached by the Supreme
Court in these cases constitute a proper interpretation and application
of the First Amendment. Today, however, it is doubtful that any of
these decisions would survive the application of the Lemon test.

85.

43 U.S. (2 How.) at 199.

86.

175 U.S. 291, 20 S. Ct. 121 (1899).

87.

Id. at 298-99, 20 S. Ct. at 123-24.

88. 245 U.S. 366,
89. Id. at 376, 38
90. Id. at 390, 38
91. 281 U.S. 370,
92. Id. at 374, 50
93. Id. at 375, 50

38
S.
S.
50

S. Ct.
Ct. at
Ct. at
S. Ct.

159 (1918).
161.
165.
335 (1930).

S. Ct. at 335.
S. Ct. at 336.
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B. Substantive Neutrality: The Supreme Court's Decisions From 1940
to 1971
The period from 1940 to 1971 marks a drastic shift in the Court's
interpretation of the Establishment Clause. During this period, not only
was the Establishment Clause made applicable to the States under the
Fourteenth Amendment, 94 but the Court established and "constitutionalized" the principles which are the basis for the present Establishment
Clause test. The Court's shift in interpretation corresponds with a change
in the American philosophy of law. Since the late nineteenth century
the Court has rejected the natural law theory in favor of theories which
associate laws with utility or policy, and general morality with religion. 95
The Court now follows a legal theory which is generally hostile to aid,
encouragement, or support of religion, because under the utility or policy
theory of law, any statute which encourages and affects religion is viewed
as the union of church and state. The Court under its present philosophy
refuses to view the encouragement of religion as a means by which the
legislature can encourage public morality, general lawfulness and dem96
ocratic principles.
Certain Supreme Court decisions set the stage for the creation of
the tripartite Lemon test. In McCollum v. Board of Education 97 and
Zorach v. Clauson, 9 two decisions concerning time release for religious
study, the Court emphasized that statutes which have an impermissible
"effect of promoting religion" are unconstitutional. The factual distinction between these two cases was slight. At issue in McCollum was
a program adopted in Champaign, Illinois, which permitted religious
instruction to be given, by private or outside teachers, to those children
whose parents so requested, in public elementary schools. There was no
cost to the schools, and religious teachers of all denominations were
offered the use of the public school classrooms for one class period
each week. The Court concluded that this statute had an impermissible
effect. 99 In Zorach, on the other hand, a New York statute authorized,
upon the written request of parents, the release of public school children
for one hour a week during the school day to attend out of school
religious centers for religious instruction or devotional exercises. The
Court upheld this statute as constitutional. 00 The distinction between

94.
95.
96.
97.

See discussion supra text accompanying note 19.
See Lamar, The Passionate Prosecutor, Time Mag. Feb. 10, 1986, at 51.
Compare the view described in the text accompanying supra notes 21-24.
333 U.S. 203, 68 S. Ct. 461 (1948).

98.

343 U.S. 306, 72 S. Ct. 679 (1952).

99. McCollum, 333 U.S. at 231, 68 S. Ct. at 475 ("Separation means separation not
something less. Jefferson's metaphor in describing the relation between Church and State
speaks of a 'wall of separation,' not of a fine line easily overstepped.").
100. 343 U.S. at 314, 72 S.Ct. at 684.
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the McCollum and Zorach decisions, if there is any, is that under the
Illinois statute the use of public school buildings lent an official aura
to the instruction and therefore, may have resulted in a child being
influenced in an "establishment like" manner.
The secular legislative purpose prong of the Lemon test was created
by the Court in the school prayer case, Engel v. Vital." At issue in
Engel was a New York statute which required that a prayer, composed
by the state legislature, be said aloud at the beginning of each school
day. The Court, in an opinion by Justice Black, held that this statute
violated the Establishment Clause, because on its face its purpose and
nature was religious. Justice Black analogized the New York law to the
prayers composed by the established Anglican Church in England, and
reasoned that since New York could not establish a church, a fortiori,
the New York legislature could not engage in any of the lesser activities,
such as the composition of a prayer, which are done by the Established
2
Church of England.1
InAbington v. Schempp,10 3 the Supreme Court combined the purpose
and effect inquiries and enunciated a two-prong Establishment Clause
test. Justice Clark set out the test for the majority:
The test may be stated as follows: what are the purpose and
the primary effect of the enactment? Ifeither isthe advancement
or inhibition of religion then the enactment exceeds the scope
of legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution. That
is to say that to withstand the strictures of the Establishment
Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary
effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion.1'0
The Pennsylvania statute at issue in Abington mandated the reading
aloud, without comment, of at least ten verses from the Holy Bible at
the opening of public school each day, followed by a standing recital
of the Lord's Prayer. Justice Clark found that there was no secular
legislative purpose in either the reading of the bible verses or the recital
of the Lord's Prayer, 5 and thus found the statute unconstitutional.
The Court reworked the two-prong test in Walz v. Tax Commission
of New York."' 6 At issue in Walz was the constitutionality of tax exempt
status given to all churches by all fifty states. There was no doubt that

101. 370 U.S. 421, 82 S. Ct. 1261 (1962).
102. Id. at 425-28, 82 S. Ct. at 1264-66.
103. 374 U.S. 203, 83 S. Ct. 1560 (1963).
104. Id. at 222, 83 S. Ct. at 1571. Compare this decision with that rendered by the
Court in Vidal where the question was whether a private act failing to promote religion
violated the laws of Pennsylvania. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
105. 374 U.S. at 224-25, 83 S. Ct. at 1572-73.
106. 397 U.S. 664, 90 S. Ct. 1409 (1970).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

some of the money which churches saved by the exemptions was used
solely for religious purposes. The Court backed away from a strict
application of the two-prong test enunciated in Abington, reasoning that
tax exemption restricted "the fiscal relationship between church and
state, and tend[ed] to complement and reinforce the desired separation
insulating each from the other."' 0 7 The Court held the tax exemption
constitutional and planted the seeds from which the Court would create
the third-prong of the Lemon test.
08
In Lemon v. Kurtzman,1
the Court propounded the three-part
Establishment Clause test which it adheres to today: "Three such tests
may be gleaned from our cases. First, the statute must have a secular
legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one
that neither advances nor inhibits religion ... ; finally, the statute must
not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion."' 9 The
Court went on to hold that the Pennsylvania program at issue, which
furnished financial support to non-public elementary and secondary schools
by way of reimbursement for the cost of teachers' salaries, textbooks,
and instructional materials, was unconstitutional because it fostered an
excessive government entanglement with religion." 0
C. Recent Applications of Substantive Neutrality: The Supreme Court
Decisions From 1972 to Present
The Court recently has begun to acknowledge the difficulties which
result from a strict application of the Lemon test. Thus far, however,
the Court has refused to reverse itself, and has instead, in two instances
found that the test was inapplicable. In both cases in which the Court
2
ignored the Lemon test, Lynch v. Donally"' and Marsh v. Chambers,"
the Court addressed statutes which, although at odds with the Courtcreated rule, authorized historically permissible actions.
In Marsh, a Nebraska state senator sued the State of Nebraska
claiming that the legislature's chaplaincy practice violated the Establishment Clause. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district
court decision holding that the paying of chaplains from public funds
violated the three-part test. The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief
Justice Burger, reversed and upheld the statute. The Court did not
employ the three-part test, but instead relied upon the practice of the

107. Id. at 677, 90 S. Ct. at 1415.
108. 403 U.S. 602, 91 S. Ct. 2105 (1971).
109. Id. at 613, 91 S. Ct. at 2111 (citation omitted).
110. Lemon and Cochran are diametrically opposed. The Court reversed itself without
acknowledging it.
Ill. 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984).
112. 463 U.S. 783, 103 S. Ct. 3330 (1983).
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First Congress, the same one which adopted the First Amendment, of
authorizing paid chaplains." 3 Justice Brennan writing in dissent was,
unlike the majority, willing to ignore history:
[TIhe argument tendered by the Court is misguided because the
Constitution is not a static document whose meaning on every
detail is fixed for all time by the life experience of the Framers.
We have recognized in a wide variety of constitutional contexts
that the practices that were in place at the time any particular
guarantee was enacted into the constitution do not necessarily
14
fix forever the meaning of that guarantee.
In Lynch, the Court addressed whether a city constitutionally could
include a nativity scene or creche in its downtown Christmas display.
Both the federal district court and court of appeals applied the Lemon
test and concluded that the city's action violated the Establishment
Clause. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that "notwithstanding the
religious significance of the creche," the city did not violate the Establishment Clause.'15
The majority opinion in Lynch used history to justify their rejection
of a rigid absolutist approach to church-state relations. The Lemon test
was viewed not as a fixed approach but as a line of inquiry useful to
determine whether "establishment had occurred.""16 Applying this reasoning, the Court found that the city's activities had a secular purpose,
because the inclusion of the creche was not motivated wholly by religious
considerations." 7 The Court also concluded that the primary effect was
not to advance or endorse religion, since any benefit to religion was
indirect, remote, and incidental." 8 Finally, the majority felt that the
creche engendered a friendly community spirit and, therefore, did not
constitute an impermissible entanglement.' '9
The dissent, written by Justice Brennan, again focused not on history
or the setting, but rather on the judicially formulated Lemon test, and
found that the city's activity violated all three criteria. Justice Brennan
expressed doubt as to the usefulness of history and its role in interpreting
the Constitution and suggested that historical analysis be limited to the
20
specific practices allowed when the document was written.
The Court has struggled to formulate an all-encompassing test. The
resulting confusion has rendered numerous statutes unconstitutional even
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790-91, 103 S. Ct. at 3335-36.
816, S. Ct. at 3348 (Brennan J., dissenting).
Ct. at 1366.
1362.
1363.
1364.
1383 (Brennan, J.,dissenting).
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though they encourage or aid no religion in particular. For example, in
Wolman v. Walter,' 2' an Ohio statute which authorized the State to
provide elementary and secondary nonpublic school pupils with secular
textbooks, standardized testing and scoring services, and diagnostic and
therapeutic services was held unconstitutional. In Committee for Public
Education v. Nyquist, 22 the Court held unconstitutional three New York
programs which provided financial aid for maintenance and repair of
facilities to ensure student health, welfare and safety in nonpublic elementary and secondary schools.
During the 1984-85 term the Court applied the Lemon test in Wallace
v. Jaffree'2' to declare unconstitutional an Alabama statute which required a moment of silence for meditation or prayer. In Wallace, the
Court was presented with a factual situation which required an interpretation of "establishment." Alabama admitted that the sole purpose
of the statute was to encourage religion, but contended that it was
constitutional because the silent prayer required in no way promoted
one religion in favor of another. The Court refused to change the
24
current definition of establishment.
The Court has adopted a test which purports to assist it in determining the constitutionality of legislative acts. This test is a recent
development and one which has no basis in the amendment to which
it is attributed. The Court has refused to recognize that the promotion
of religion generally is not wrong, but a device by which general morality,
democracy, and social welfare can be aided. In order to achieve the
present result the Court has ignored one hundred and fifty years of
jurisprudence.
III. A

REFORMATION OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES

The interpretation of the Constitution can be approached from
two vantages. First, the Court can attempt to ascertain the intent
of the adopters, and after ascertaining that attempt [sic] apply
the Constitution as the adopters intended it to be applied. Second, the Court can treat the Constitution as a living document,
chameleon-like in its complexion, which changes to suit the needs
of the times and whims of the interpreters. In the opinion of
this Court, the only proper approach is to interpret the Con-

121. 433 U.S. 229, 97 S. Ct. 2593 (1977). Compare Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works,
426 U.S. 736, 96 S. Ct. 2337 (1976) (sustaining federal aid to parochial colleges).
122. 413 U.S. 756, 93 S. Ct. 2955 (1973).
123. 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985).
124. Id. Nevertheless, the Wallace opinion was a plurality and the two concurring
opinions written by Justice Powell, id. at 2493, 2494, and Justice O'Connor, id. at 2496,
2501, suggest that the test now requires that the statute's "sole purpose" be religious.
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stitution as its drafters and .adopters intended. The Constitution
is, after all, the supreme law of the land. It contains provisions
for amending it; if the country as a whole decided that the
present text of the Constitution no longer satisfied contemporary
needs then the only constitutional course is to amend the Constitution by following its formal, mandated procedures. Amendment through judicial fiat is both unconstitutional and illegal.
Amendment through judicial fiat breeds disrespect for the law,
and it undermines the very basic notion that this country is
governed by laws and not by men ...
Let us have faith in the rightness of our charter and the
patience to persevere in adhering to its principles. If we do so
then all will have input into change and not just a few.' 25
The Constitution establishes a republican government which can
respond to the needs, wants and realities which face the people of this
nation. 26' The issue regarding the interpretation of the religion clauses
is best framed as: Who is right-five justices or the document which
they purport to interpret? At any one point in time it may be the
justices or those in positions of political power who provide the actual
answer; nevertheless, the mere assertion of the position of authority
does not make their decision right. Instead, to determine right or wrong
in this context one must look to the document itself and the history
and purpose surrounding it.
A. A Grammatical Interpretation of the Establishment Clause
States are empowered to impose restrictions and to legislate on issues
regarding the public health, welfare, safety, or morals.' 27 This power
has been without a doubt curtailed by the Fourteenth Amendment and
the subsequent application of the Bill of Rights to the states. The Court,
however, in the process of incorporating these amendments, an issue
beyond the scope of this article, 28 has, much like in the Lochner era,
imposed its own conception of what constitutes health, welfare, safety
and morals upon the state and federal governments, and in the process
has payed little more than lip service to the document it interprets. 2 9
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Such an approach makes the Constitution a document of five men
0
instead of a document for "We the people.""13
If we take the words of the First Amendment as understood in
their usual meaning and most known signification, the Establishment
Clause only prohibits the establishment of a single religion. "An" as
used in the First Amendment is an indefinite article. An indefinite article
is used to impart specificity to the noun or to single out the referent
from the class named by the noun. Therefore, "an" as used in the
amendment is singular."' "An" refers to a particular religion. Under
a grammatical analysis all the Establishment Clause prohibits is a law
which establishes one religion.
The word "establishment" poses more difficulty. Its meaning as
defined by the Random House College Dictionary, is an "act of establishing[;] . . . the state or fact of being established[;] . . . a constituted
order or system[;] . . . an institution[;] . . . the recognition of a church
as the state church.'1 2 If the broadest definition is used, any legislation
tending to prefer one religion over another would violate the Constitution. If the narrowest definition is used only laws relating to one
religion and recognizing that religion as the State church are prohibited."3

to interpret, is difficult to apply and yields unprincipled results, I see little use
in it. The "crucible of litigation," . . has produced only consistent unpredictability, and today's effort is just a continuation of "the sisyphean task of
trying to patch together the 'blurred, indistinct and variable barrier' described
in Lemon v. Kurtzman."
Id. at 2519-20 (citations omitted).
130. The Court bears the primary blame for the present reading of the First Amendment. Nevertheless, Congress and the Executive branch should not be absolved of all
wrongdoing. As pointed out by Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist No. 78:
Whoever attentively considers the different departments of power must perceive,
that, in a government in which they are separate from each other, the judiciary,
from the nature of its functions, will always be least dangerous to the political
rights of the constitution; because it will be least in capacity to annoy or injure
them.. The Executive not only dispenses the honors, but holds the sword of the
community. The legislature not only commands the purse, but prescribes the
rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be regulated. The
judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over either the sword or the purse;
no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take
no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither Force nor
Will, but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the
executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments.
The Federalist No. 78 at 490 (A. Hamilton) (B. Wright ed. 1961). See also Gunther,
supra note 127, at 30 (noting that Presidential consideration of direct defiance has been
very rare).
131. United States Government Printing Office Style Manual 47 (rev'd ed. 1939).
132. The Random House College Dictionary 452 (rev'd ed. 1975).
133. See Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291, 20 S. Ct. 121 (1899). The rationale in
Bradfield suggests the more narrow definition should apply. See also supra notes 86, 87
and accompanying text.
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In either case a law which promotes religion generally would not violate
the language of the clause.
To the extent the term "establishment" is not sufficiently defined,
we next examine the word in terms of context. Blackstone advises that
we examine the preamble to the act and other laws made by the same
legislatures. 3 4 If these rules are followed, "establishment" should be
defined narrowly, since the legislature which adopted the term adopted
laws which violated the more broad definition.'"
Next, the clause should be analyzed in terms of subject-matter. The
words when viewed in this context should be examined from "the eye
of the legislator" and the ends desired. The ends our founding fathers
aspired to cannot be determined with exactness. The ratification debates,
however, do demonstrate that the primary prohibition which the Establishment Clause was designed to prevent was the "establishment" of a
national church. 3 6 Therefore, after application of the religion clauses
to the states, it should only prevent the establishment of a state church.
If the words still are uncertain, which this author suggests they are
not, then and only then should we look to the reason and spirit.' In
this vein, however, it is not only the reason and spirit of church-state
relations, but notions of federalism, judicial activism, and alternate
remedies available under the Constitution, which should be taken into
account.' 3 8
B. A Common Sense Interpretation of The First Amendment
Under the Court's interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause and
the Establishment Clause, the only political body which can safely legislate on religious issues is the Court. The Court has interpreted the
Free Exercise Clause as a prohibition against legislation which interferes
with religious practices. A law in order to be valid requires the state
to show a "strong interest" to counter the Court's belief that laws
which inadvertently effect religion are improper.1' 9 At the same time,
however, a state which attempts to accommodate religious believers by

134. W. Blackstone, I Commentaries on the Laws of England 59-61 (1890).
135. See supra notes 37-49 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 16-40 and accompanying text.
137. Blackstone, supra note 134.
138. The Court has not followed these rules in religion cases. For example, it has
created special taxpayer standing for potential violations of the religion clauses. See, e.g.,
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 88 S. Ct. 1942 (1968). This contradicts the general rule
which denies taxpayers standing to litigate, see, e.g., Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S.
447, 43 S. Ct. 597 (1923). But see Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291, 20 S. Ct. 121
(1899) (the Court granted standing).
139. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 92 S. Ct. 1526 (1972).
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granting exemptions from the general law violates the Court's Estab4
lishment Clause test, since it prefers religion to non-religion. 0
The Court's present interpretation of the two clauses produces inconsistent and contradictory results. The state and federal legislatures
can neither make laws designed to accommodate free exercise, nor can
they pass laws which promote religion, since to legislatively accommodate
free exercise of religion constitutes a violation of the Establishment
Clause, while a law that fails to accommodate violates the Free Exercise
Clause. Thus, during the 1984-85 term the Court, in Thornton v. Caldor,
Inc., held unconstitutional a Connecticut statute which required an employer to allow his employees to take their Sabbath day off.'41 Nevertheless, a law which interferes with an individual's religious practice,
such as the statute at issue in Wisconsin v. Yoder,142 which required all
students to attend school through the age of sixteen, is unconstitutional
because it violates the Free Exercise Clause. 43 The only significant
distinction between these cases is that in Thornton, the statute, unlike
the Court decision in Yoder, protected all religious faiths instead of the
practices of only one religion.
The inconsistency in these lines of cases is resolved if the Establishment Clause is properly read. The Establishment Clause would be
applied only when the state or federal government adopts legislation
which would have the effect of creating a national or state religion.
The Free Exercise Clause, on the other hand, if properly applied would
act as the check on legislation which unreasonably interfered with the
free exercise of religious beliefs. Under this reading of the Religion
Clauses, the Court's decision in Yoder would stand, since the plaintiffs
had proved that the law interfered with their religious beliefs and served
no reasonable purpose. The decision in Thornton, however, would be
reversed. Though the statute at issue in Thornton may be disliked because
it curtails or burdens the commercial community, it does not violate
the Establishment Clause because it does not benefit any religion in
particular. The statute promotes free exercise, since it prevents the owner
of the business from unduly imposing his religious beliefs upon his
employees by forcing them to forego their religious practice or risk
losing their job.
Interpreting the religion clauses in this manner would realign the
Court with the document it purports to apply. The Court would still
be free to find that a particular statute is invalid, because it unreasonably
curtails an individual's free exercise, but not because it merely encourages
religion.
Henry T. Miller
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